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This instruction implements AFPD 31-3, *Air Base Defense*. It provides guidance for air base defense (ABD) during the transition to war and contingency operations. Use it with Joint Pub 3-10, *Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations*, February 26, 1993, and Joint Pub 3-10.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Base Defense*, March 15, 1993. Related directives and instructions include AFPD 31-1, *Physical Security*; AFPD 31-2, *Law Enforcement*; AFI 31-301, *Air Force Physical Security Program*; AFI 31-201, *Security Police Standards and Procedures*; AFH 31-302, *Air Base Defense Collective Skills*; and AFH 31-305, *Security Police Deployment Planning*. See [Attachment 1](#) for abbreviations and acronyms used in this instruction.

(PACAF) This supplement applies to active duty and Wartime gained Air National Guard (ANG) when published in ANGIND 2.

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This revision corrects paragraph [3.2.](#). The | indicates revised material.

(PACAF) This revision corrects administrative errors, updates references where required, and incorporates minor clarification and changes. [Chapter 3](#) sets annual requirements for SF UTCs participation in Commando Warrior training; outlines maximum number of personnel requiring training on each weapon to support assigned UTC. [Chapter 4](#) requires QFEBA/B HQ Elements to use the template at [Attachment 1 \(Added-PACAF\)](#) when developing combined defense plans (CDP); annual validation and coordination procedures for CDPs. New or revised material is indicated by an (*).

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Chapter 1

AIR BASE DEFENSE MISSION

1.1. Mission. ABD forces must maintain a secure environment by detecting and engaging enemy forces that threaten sustained air operations. These forces must be organized to prevent and defeat attacks rather than to react passively. They must be integrated into rear security operations with other services, host nation (HN), and allied forces. Security police forces must also be prepared to support peacetime contingency operations.

1.1.1. Defending US Air Force resources is the responsibility of all air base personnel. US Air Force personnel who are armed and trained (for example, Prime Beef, Prime Ribs, combat communications units, and selectively armed personnel) must take an active part in ABD. Senior Air Force commanders at each base must carefully consider selective arming and augmentation programs. If the threat requires more armed personnel than are already in place, commanders must plan for time-phased, force deployment list (TPFDL) reinforcements.

1.1.1.1. (Added-PACAF) The senior Air Force tactical commander, with the advice of the DFC and the base Security Council, will determine if the installation requires a SELARM and/or Ready Augmentee program.

1.1.2. The senior Air Force commander organizes, plans, trains, and equips ABD forces. The commander improves ABD as necessary by arranging additional support from other US Service and HN support forces.

1.2. The Threat. Current and accurate threat information is vital for planning ABD operations. Threats to air bases are grouped into three levels, each denoting a responsibility for action. The enemy may use one or all of these to attack air bases. ABD forces must be capable of reacting to nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warfare during all threat levels, to ensure successful sortie generation.

1.2. (PACAF) HQ PACAF/IN Command Intelligence Estimate for Air Base Operability Planning (CIEAP) is the directive used to determine and identify the threat at PACAF installations. Additionally, the following Air Force Handbooks (AFH) provide guidance and essential information in the ABD planning process: AFH 31-302 Air Base Defense and Contingency Operation Guidance and Procedures, AFH 31-303 Basic Combat Skills Handbook, and AFH 31-305 Security Police Deployment Planning Handbook. Applicable Army Field Manuals are referenced in [Attachment 3](#) to this supplement.

1.2.1. Level I includes small-scale threats conducted by agents, sympathizers, and partisans, and agent-supervised or independently initiated terrorist activities. Level I threats must be defeated by ABD forces.

1.2.2. Level II includes long-range reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and sabotage operations conducted by special purpose forces, guerrilla forces, unconventional forces, or small tactical units. Level II threats must be defeated or delayed until assistance comes from response forces, usually US Army Military Police units assigned to area commands with supporting fire.

1.2.3. Level III threats include major attacks by aircraft and theater missiles armed with conventional weapons or NBC weapons, in addition to major ground attacks. Level III threats may require timely

assistance from a response force (RF) or a tactical combat force (TCF); however, ABD forces must be able to delay ground-based threats.

1.3. Theaters of Operation. ABD operations are needed everywhere from mature theaters to austere regions. Air Force leadership must be able to adapt to a variety of ABD requirements.

1.3.1. A mature theater is an area where ABD operations are conducted on existing main operating bases (MOB) or host nation (HN) bases called collocated operating bases (COB).

1.3.2. An austere region is an area where ABD forces may deploy to sites without existing US Air Force or HN facilities.

1.3.3. Rear areas of a theater are areas that assist in providing freedom of action and continuity of operations, logistics, and command and control. Rear areas may be limited in land mass or may encompass several national boundaries. They are vulnerable to a variety of enemy weapons systems, special operations forces, and surveillance systems. Numerous other units and support facilities that contribute to sustained sortie operations may be targeted and must be defended.

1.4. Joint Operations for ABD. Most future conflicts will be a joint or coalition campaign. Joint or combined campaigns are the integrated military activities of two or more service components- Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. MAJCOMs and units should refer to Joint Publication 3-10, *Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations*, and Joint Publication 3-10.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Base Defense*, for guidance on conducting ABD in a joint or combined rear area. The primary mission of a joint operation is to sustain the campaign and major operations of the joint force. Joint operational functions include security, communications, intelligence, sustainment, area management, movements, infrastructure development, and HN support. Joint Publication O-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, provides additional references.

1.5. HN Support. The joint forces commander (JFC) normally establishes a single office to serve as the executive agent to manage and coordinate HN support for ABD. MAJCOMs and deployed units use this office to resolve conflicts when seeking HN support. Air Force senior commanders must actively solicit HN support. Component commanders are responsible for the use and employment of HN support IAW JFC directions and guidelines.

Chapter 2

RESPONSIBILITIES

Section 2A—General Responsibilities

2.1. Chief of Security Police (HQ USAF/SP): 1) Is the approval authority for ABD policy, 2) Plans, develops, and monitors all US Air Force ABD programs, 3) Serves as office of collateral responsibility with HQ USAF/XO in developing regulatory requirements for US Air Force arming policies, 4) Coordinates with HQ USAF/XOXW on theater operational plan (OPLAN) Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) development to ensure consistency with ABD doctrine, 5) Manages distribution of ABD equipment, weaponry, and vehicles received through central procurement, and 6) Manages the ABD program objective memorandum (POM) funding process.

2.1.1. Headquarters Air Force Security Police Agency (HQ AFSPA):

2.1.1.1. Plans, develops, and reviews programs concerning ABD training, employing Resource Augmentation Duty Program (READY) augmentees, and selectively armed owner or user personnel in support of ABD.

2.1.1.2. Reviews ABD training requirements and recommends curriculum changes.

2.1.1.3. Coordinates with supporting MAJCOM/SP staffs for wartime deployment of ABD forces.

2.1.1.4. Monitors SP participation in Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises.

2.2. Air Force Intelligence (HQ USAF/IN). Provides guidance for Air Force intelligence support to ABD operations.

2.3. MAJCOM/IN:

2.3.1. Ensures the Defense Force Commander (DFC) receives real-time combat information and intelligence data about enemy forces in their tactical area of responsibility (TAOR).

2.3.2. Upon request, reviews other ABD threat estimates, special subject summaries, and related reports.

2.3.3. Collects and processes all source intelligence to help commanders during wartime and contingencies.

2.3.4. Plans, programs, and budgets for intelligence resources necessary to support air base operations.

2.3.5. Provides theater-specific intelligence training and materials to unit personnel to support ABO.

2.3.6. Develops a command intelligence estimate for ABD planning and provides it and other ABO related threat materials to units.

2.4. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI):

2.4.1. AFOSI provides counterintelligence activities to include collection/production of information concerning foreign intelligence, investigations of terrorism, sabotage, and related acts, offensive operations against foreign intelligence services, and anti-terrorism services.

2.4.2. AFOSI provides the DFC counterintelligence (CI) information within the ABD TAOR as well as establishing an effective liaison with host nation intelligence, security, and law enforcement sources.

2.4.3. AFOSI must also maintain the capability to respond to criminal activities.

2.4.4. AFOSI operations are most effective against Level I and II threats.

2.5. HQ Air Force Material Command (HQ AFMC). Through the Air Base Systems Branch, explores new technologies and conducts research, development, acquisition, testing, and evaluation on new systems for ABD.

2.6. The National Guard Bureau (NGB):

2.6.1. Organizes, trains, and equips their SP units for wartime duties in coordination with the gaining MAJCOM/SP and HQ USAF/SP.

2.6.2. Ensures that each Air National Guard (ANG) SP unit completes ground combat skills (GCS) training at least every 4 years, preferably every 3 years.

2.7. HQ Air Force Reserve (HQ AFRES):

2.7.1. Organizes, trains, and equips their SP units for wartime duties in coordination with the gaining MAJCOM/SP and HQ USAF/SP.

2.7.2. Ensures each Air Force Reserve (AFRES) SP unit completes GCS training at least every 4 years, preferably every 3 years.

2.8. HQ Air Education and Training Command (HQ AETC). Develops, operates, and maintains initial SP training programs in coordination with HQ USAF/SP. Refer to [Chapter 3](#) for training requirements.

2.9. MAJCOM Chiefs or Directors of Security Police:

2.9.1. Organize, train, equip, and maintain ABD elements according to this instruction, AFMAN 10-401, *Operation Plan and Concept Plan Development and Implementation*, AFH 31-305, *Security Police Deployment Planning*, and other planning documents.

2.9.2. Manage the manpower, equipment, and performance of assigned unit type codes (UTC).

2.9.3. Prepare plans and documents for getting necessary ABD equipment.

2.9.4. Establish sustainment training standards and advise subordinate units on ABD skills training.

2.9.5. Make recommendations to HQ USAF/SPO on policies concerning organizing, training, and equipping deployable SP UTCs.

2.9.6. Manage command SP participation in HQ USAF, MAJCOM, and JCS exercises.

2.9.7. Complete and forward RCS: HAF-SP(SA)9378 report AF Form 3594, *Security Police Equipment and Manning Report*, or applicable Security Police Automated Systems data base, following the guidance in [Attachment 2](#).

2.10. Supported MAJCOMs:

2.10.1. Develop TPFDD requirements to support theater OPLANs and CONPLANs.

2.10.2. Ensure sustaining munitions quantities are consistent with authorizations and SP forces, including in-place and continental United States (CONUS) augmentation forces projected for deployment.

2.10.3. Identify equipment and resupply procedures for the deploying units in OPLANs that contain requirements for SP units.

2.10.4. Establish subsistence requirements with Headquarters Defense Commissary Agency to support theater taskings.

2.10.5. Advise supporting commands of requirements unique to the particular theater such as 40mm munitions mix for fighting load, unique vehicle or equipment needs, etc.

2.10.6. Identify vehicle requirements for prepositioning and update requirements in TPFDDs.

2.10.7. Provide after-action reports (AAR) for all mobility deployments and subsequent rotation or replacement units to HQ AFSPA/SPSD. Prepare reports using the specific formats and content information available in AFP 102-2, Volume I, *Joint User Handbook for Message Text Formats*, and as supplemented by AFMAN 10-206, *Operational Reporting*. When AFP 102-2, Volume I, does not contain specific format for the report, use the general administration format with the report's name as the SUBJECT.

2.11. Supporting MAJCOMs: 1) Apply the guidance in War and Mobilization Plan (WMP) -1, Annex T, to maximize the number of active-duty personnel available for wartime deployment and make optimal use of augmentation and selectively armed personnel, 2) Organize, train, equip, and maintain the deployable units reported in WMP-3, Part 2, 3) Ensure UTCs from active and reserve components are deployable within the designed operational capability (DOC) time, 4) Develop budget, requisition, and accounting procedures for required weapons, munitions, equipment, and subsistence, 5) Include procedures for deploying WMP-3 committed units in command mobility planning documents, 6) Maintain a deployment data base for use in time-critical directed deployments, and 7) Provide AARs to HQ AFSPA/SPSD for all mobility deployments and subsequent rotations or replacement units.

2.11.1. Provide additional personnel to CONUS bases (if necessary) from other bases in the command when all OPLAN deployment requirements are satisfied. Before using extra personnel from other bases, consider using personnel in the local base READY program and selectively armed owner or user personnel to fill shortfalls. In all cases, coordinate plans to deploy personnel from other bases with the MAJCOM personnel staff.

2.12. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command. In coordination with HQ USAF/SP and HQ USAF/XOXD, is the executive agent for developing and revising joint (Army and Air Force) ABD doctrine.

2.13. Base Tenant Units. Provide any support necessary for ABD. Support may include the selective arming of owner or user personnel to defend people and resources in their immediate work areas and the augmentation of other ABD forces.

2.13.1. (Added-PACAF) SELARM PROGRAM ARMS AND EQUIPMENT. Arms and equipment for the SELARM force are an owning unit responsibility.

2.14. Security Police Unit Commanders:

2.14.1. Ensure all security police personnel are trained and proficient in individual GCS IAW STP 21-1-SMCT, *Soldiers Manual of Common Tasks, Skill Level 1*.

2.14.2. Ensure each UTC participates in an ABD exercise at home-station at least once a year. Collective skills guidance is outlined in AFH 31-302, *Air Base Defense Collective Skills*. A MAJCOM training center or joint regional training center (JRTC) deployment will satisfy this requirement.

2.14.3. Ensure assigned Individual Mobilization Augmentees receive GCS sustainment training.

2.14.4. Ensure tasked UTCs prepare and maintain current deployment folders for use in home station training, to include country data, maps, photos, threat estimates (IN/OSI), and rules of engagement.

2.15. Defense Force Commander (DFC):

2.15.1. The senior Air Force commander responsible for the air base normally delegates operational authority to conduct ABD to the DFC. The DFC's staff typically consists of a headquarters (HQ) administrative branch (S1), a combat information section (S2), an operations branch (S3), and a logistics branch (S4).

2.15.2. The DFC:

2.15.2.1. Establishes a base defense operations center (BDOC) that serves as the focal point for ABD and security.

2.15.2.2. Plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls all ABD efforts through the BDOC staff.

2.15.2.3. Coordinates ABD issues and requests for assistance with the rear area operations center (RAOC) or rear tactical operations center (RTOC).

2.15.2.4. Submits situation reports through WOC.

2.15.2.5. Disseminates rules of engagement to all ABD forces.

2.15.3. If possible, the DFC exchanges liaison representatives with other US, HN, and allied forces within the area of operation. If this is not possible, the DFC must communicate closely with the RAOC, RTOC or other command and control elements of friendly forces.

Section 2B—Responsibilities for Communications

2.16. ABD Communications Support:

2.16.1. SP units preparing for ABD operations need certain items for secure communications, which may be requested through their communications security manager: 1) Cryptological material, 2) Sig-

nal Operating Instructions (SOIs), 3) Voice call signs, 4) Procedural guidance on accounting, maintenance, and operational use of communications security material.

2.16.2. HQ USAF/SC coordinates and provides communications expertise to HQ USAF/SP, other Air Staff, and MAJCOM/SCs on communications issues and helps HQ AFMC with logistical support for communications-computer systems.

2.16.3. HQ USAF/SP and MAJCOM/SP coordinates procurement of communications equipment for ABD and CONUS mobility forces with HQ USAF/SC or the respective MAJCOM/SC.

2.16.3.1. MAJCOM/SPs plan and request frequency authorizations. They ensure SP units tasked with a mobility or in-place ABD mission provide a list of all communications equipment to the local and MAJCOM/SC communications unit. This list includes authorized equipment, items on hand, and items on order. Local communications units then organize the necessary maintenance support.

2.16.4. Both supporting and supported commands provide wartime maintenance support for ABD communications and electronics equipment at deployed locations. Communications repair personnel maintain this equipment and:

2.16.4.1. Plan for setting up and redeploying communications-electronics equipment at the deployment site.

2.16.4.2. Ensure communications maintenance UTCs are fully trained and supplied with bench test equipment they would need to maintain SP ABD tactical ground communications equipment.

2.16.4.3. Identify and plan for surge communications requirements according to theater planning.

2.16.4.4. Ensure essential communications and computer systems have established local maintenance.

2.16.5. During peacetime, ground combat radio systems are maintained by the base-level communications unit or through contract services. During wartime and contingency deployments, deployable communications UTCs (6KMQ8) or in-place supported command communications personnel maintain the radio systems.

Chapter 3

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

3.1. The Air Force Security Police Academy. The SP Academy includes GCS training as a permanent part of the curriculum for entry and career progression. All SP personnel must complete the appropriate resident entry level GCS course upon accession into the law enforcement, security, and SP officer Air Force specialties. Additionally, career development courses for enlisted 5 and 7 level training include GCS material.

3.2. Personnel Assigned to UTCs. These personnel must complete training as follows: 1) Individuals, captain through colonel and senior NCOs in ranks of master sergeant through chief master sergeant, assigned to an SP headquarters element UTC (QFEBA or QFEBB) must complete the ABD command course. This course is recommended for all other SP officers in the ranks of captain through colonel and senior noncommissioned officers in ranks of master sergeant through chief master sergeant, 2) Individuals in the grades of sergeant through master sergeant assigned to a UTC must complete the GCS level II course. This course is recommended for all other SP enlisted personnel in the ranks of sergeant through master sergeant, 3) All personnel must receive and maintain weapons qualification IAW AFM 36-2227, *Combat Arms Training and Maintenance Program*.

3.2.1. Each UTC must attend a MAJCOM level training squadron or flight, JRTC or JCS exercise at least every 3 years, preferably every 2 years.

3.2.1.1. (Added-PACAF) All SF units will participate in Commando Warrior training annually. Each off-peninsula unit tasked with an UTC will attend the RTC with at least fifty- percent of their tasked UTCs annually and all Korean based in-place UTCs will attend Commando Warrior annually with one hundred percent of their tasked UTCs. Unit commanders can request additional tasked UTCs attend classes not listed on the annual schedule, if spaces are available. Additions to the schedule will be approved by HQ PACAF/SFXT and coordinated with HQ PACAF/SFXX and 51 TRF prior to final approval.

3.2.2. (Added-PACAF) READY Augmentee and SELARM Training. The DFC is responsible for developing a viable training program using all of the wing's resources. The DFC is the "subject matter expert" for the training program.

3.2.3. (Added-PACAF) [Attachment 2 \(Added-PACAF\)](#) maximum number of personnel authorized to be qualified on each weapon to support the assigned UTC.

Chapter 4

ABD OPERATIONS

4.1. Planning for ABD. ABD planners must know the strategic intelligence and threats for their expected area of operation. The *ABO Threat Support Document Worldwide Threat to Air Bases: 1991-2001 (U)* is a source for this information.

4.1.1. Plans must address the ground order of battle for each threat level. Focus on expected enemy force capabilities and ensure the ABD plan (format in AFMAN 10-401) details how to fight and defeat enemies with those capabilities.

4.1.2. The plan must:

4.1.2. (PACAF) QFEBA/B HQ Elements will use the standard template ([Attachment 1 \(Added-PACAF\)](#)) when developing Combined Defense Plans (CDP).

4.1.2.1. Describe the enemy, friendly situations, and the ABD force organization.

4.1.2.1. (PACAF) Combined Defense Planning. MOB will have a single, coordinated, combined security/base defense plan releasable to host nation forces. The plan must encompass all base defense efforts, both on and off the installation. For COBs, a Combined Defense Plan, releasable to host nation forces, will be developed by the QFEBA/B HQ Element assigned to each COB. The plan must be validated annually by the responsible QFEBA/B HQ Element. Validation visits to COBs must be coordinated through 607th AOG/SF and should not be scheduled during GCRES scheduled curriculum. 607th AOG/SF is the on-peninsula representative responsible for coordinating COB CDPs with host nation forces.

4.1.2.2. Outline the mission of the ABD force, DFC's concept of operation, logistics and administrative support, and appropriate command and signal information.

4.1.2.2. (PACAF) ABD Area of Operations (AO) Coordination. MOB DFCs will coordinate an ABD AO with the commander responsible for the external defense of the air base. The DFC is responsible for defending the area inside the tactical perimeter. The size of the ABD AO is determined by applying situational factors of METT-T.

4.1.2.3. Outline the responsibilities of other US Air Force, Department of Defense (DoD), allied, or HN forces available for ABD.

4.1.2.3. (PACAF) SELARM Program. SELARM positions, whether static DFPs or tactical sentries, must be integrated into the base defense plan. SELARM forces are posted at the direction of the senior Air Force tactical commander, as recommended by the DFC. SELARM forces protect their critical facilities when the threat is high enough to jeopardize sortie generation. Some positions may require continuous posting, while others are based on the threat. When implementing SELARM the following must be determined:

4.1.2.3.1. (Added-PACAF) A list of the critical facilities to be protected by SELARM forces and the number of personnel each participating unit must maintain to provide the required level of protection.

4.1.2.3.2. (Added-PACAF) Which facilities, if any, are critical enough to require full-time SELARM posting?

4.1.2.3.3. (Added-PACAF) Having selectively armed forces does not negate the need for READY augmentation to the ground defense force.

4.1.2.3.4. (Added-PACAF) Each manned SELARM position must be in contact with the relevant sector command post.

4.1.2.3.5. (Added-PACAF) Fields of fire for SELARM positions will be determined by the owning SF sector commander who will also ensure range cards are completed and ROE is briefed.

4.1.2.4. Tell how the SP force makes the transition from peacetime to wartime ABD operations.

4.1.2.4. (PACAF) READY Program. These personnel become full-time members of the defense force during wartime or a contingency. The READY program provides manpower based on a validated shortfall of in-place defense forces. It augments the base defense force before the arrival of PACAF/CONUS based follow-on TPFDL forces. Having READY augmentees does not negate the need for a selectively armed force. The READY program is governed by AFI 10-217.

4.1.2.5. Address how selectively armed owner or user security integrates into ABD during the transition.

4.1.2.6. Outline and assign areas of responsibility for ABD.

4.1.3. (Added-PACAF) Mission Folders. To prepare for wartime employment at PACAF MOBs and COBs, additive forces will use Mission folders. Supporting QFEBA/B HQ elements are responsible for updating their mission folders annually, as specified below. As a minimum, a mission folder will contain:

4.1.3.1. (Added-PACAF) A copy of the defense, security, or resources protection plan as appropriate for the supported location.

4.1.3.2. (Added-PACAF) Base Support Plan (400-2).

4.1.3.3. (Added-PACAF) Aerial photographs.

4.1.3.4. (Added-PACAF) 1:50,000 maps (2 per inbound UTC), to include any overlays depicting sectors, sector command posts, defensive fighting positions, target reference points, mine fields, heavy weapons positions, track plans, resupply routes, coordination points, etc.

4.1.3.5. (Added-PACAF) A summary of annual weather conditions (if not included in the base defense plan).

4.1.3.6. (Added-PACAF) Unit OPRs and POCs, along with DSN voice and fax numbers.

4.1.3.7. (Added-PACAF) Secure telephone (STU III) contact numbers, when available.

NOTE(Added-PACAF): Mission folders must be kept current and may contain additional information at the discretion of the OPR. Provide copies/update information to HQ PACAF/SFOD, 607th AOG/SF, and all supporting unit/UTCs annually. When there are no changes, provide HQ

PACAF/SFOD, 607th AOG/SF and all supporting unit UTCs, a letter certifying annual validation date.

4.1.4. (Added-PACAF) Critical/Key Assets. The senior Air Force tactical commander, through the Installation Security Council, will determine a prioritized listing of key and mission critical assets. Use these lists to determine numbers and placement of SELARM and defense forces.

4.2. The Theater Combatant Commander:

4.2.1. Oversees all joint rear area (JRA) operations.

4.2.2. Assigns responsibilities for defending the JRA and establishes the command or coordination method.

4.2.3. Exercises command authority or operational control over all theater joint forces.

4.2.3. (PACAF) At MOBs, the Chief, Security Forces is also the DFC. The DFC will establish a staff to organize and lead the defense effort. Responsibilities for the various staff elements are found in AFH 31-302.

4.2.4. Designates which service will provide external forces for each air base.

4.2.4. (PACAF) At COBs, the USAF DFC is under the operational control of the host nation officer responsible for defense operations. At ROKAF bases, the Chief, Ground Operations Center (GOC) performs this function.

4.2.4.1. (Added-PACAF) For Korean COBs, the 607th AOG/SF coordinates individual areas of responsibility for each base receiving additive forces.

4.2.5. Defines the command and control relationship between subordinate area commanders and air base commanders.

4.2.6. Defines each base TAOR.

4.2.7. Establishes theater rules of engagement based upon guidance from the national command authorities through the Chairman of the JCS.

4.2.8. Appoints a JRA coordinator (JRAC) who establishes a joint rear tactical operations center, using joint force staff personnel and representatives from components operating in the JRA.

4.3. Standardizing Employment. To ensure standardized employment, procedures, concepts, and tactics, units involved in ABD operations follow the guidance in AFH 31-302, *Air Base Defense Collective Skills*.

4.3.1. (Added-PACAF) Mobile Reserve (MR) Composition. A mobile reserve becomes particularly critical in the pre-TPFDD arrival stage; it is the DFC's "swing force" to provide a flexible response capability to unexpected events. Both MOBs and COBs will maintain a MR regardless of the situation. Prior to TPFDD arrival, the DFC will devise plans to use available forces in a MR configuration. The size of the MR depends on available forces, as well as the impending threat; however, a minimum of one squad (13 personnel) will be maintained to have a credible MR capability. The MR force must be capable of defeating or delaying the impending threat. Upon integration of TPFDD forces, MOBs will maintain a minimum of a flight sized MR, while COBs will maintain a squad sized MR. MR forces will be equipped with armored vehicles and

employed in accordance with doctrine outlined in AFH 31-302. The DFC will determine weapons requirements based on many factors including threat, MR configuration, and terrain. As a mobile element, the MR uses tactics similar to those of mechanized infantry or cavalry; any of the field manuals (FMs) outlining those tactics may also be used as a reference for MR operations (See [Attachment 2](#)).

4.4. Conducting ABD Operations. Successful ABD depends on a clear division of terrain responsibility and the sound application of the five principles of defense: 1) Aggressive defense, 2) Defense-in-depth, 3) All-around defense, 4) Integrated defense, and 5) Defense organized around key terrain and vital resources.

4.4.1. Analyzing the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, and time available (METT-T) enables ABD forces to mount the most effective defense.

4.4.2. The DFC organizes forces to defeat level I threats and delay level II or level III threats. When a threat exceeds the ABD force capabilities, the BDOC notifies the echelon RAOC or RTOC, which coordinates the employment of an RF or a TCF as outlined in Joint Publication 3.10.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Base Defense*.

4.4.3. If an air threat exists to US Air Force MOBs, COBs, or bare bases, air defense assets will normally be assigned. Ensure any assigned air defense assets are incorporated into the overall ABD plan.

4.4.4. (Added-PACAF) Combined Defense Operations Center (CDOC). Each MOB will establish a primary and an alternate CDOC to serve as the planning, command and control, and communication hub for ground defense operations. The DFC will designate CDOC locations. The S-3 is responsible for CDOC operations and commands it when the DFC is absent.

4.4.4.1. (Added-PACAF) The Fire Direction Center (FDC) will be located within the CDOC facility.

4.4.4.2. (Added-PACAF) There will be a Point Air Defense/Short Range Air Defense liaison in the CDOC.

4.4.4.3. (Added-PACAF) CDOC must also contain liaison elements from units attached to the GDF, OPCON to the DFC, or host nation forces supporting defense operations.

4.4.4.4. (Added-PACAF) Host Nation Liaison Elements. At MOBs, CDOC will include liaison elements from host nation units defending the base. At COBs, the USAF DFC will provide a liaison to the host nation defense center (GOC at ROKAF bases).

4.4.4.5. (Added-PACAF) The alternate CDOC will mirror the capabilities of the primary CDOC and will be capable of maintaining uninterrupted ABD operations in the event the primary CDOC is destroyed or damaged.

4.4.5. (Added-PACAF) Readiness States (RS). Department of Defense Directive 2000.12, DOD Combating Terrorism Program, outlines standardized measures implemented when increased THREATCONS are declared. The DFC will create a force readiness system, based on the tactical situation and METT-T, which permits sustainability of ABD field operations. The system will provide full manning when the threat is imminent, but also enables the defense force to rest when the threat lessens. The system should be simple, and easy to remember. Sample readiness states are as follows:

4.4.5.1. (Added-PACAF) RS 1 - Stand-to. 100% of personnel awake, alert, posted.

4.4.5.2. (Added-PACAF) RS 2 - 75% of personnel awake, alert, posted. Remainder in rest, hygiene, work status.

4.4.5.3. (Added-PACAF) RS 3 - 50% of personnel awake, alert, posted. Remainder in rest, hygiene, work status.

4.4.5.4. (Added-PACAF) RS 4 - 25% of personnel awake, alert, posted. Remainder in rest, hygiene, work status.

4.4.5.5. (Added-PACAF) RS 5 - 15% of personnel awake, alert, posted. Remainder in rest, hygiene, work status.

4.4.6. (Added-PACAF) ABD Manpower. Korean MOB's are authorized ABD manpower in addition to validated security force requirements. Commanders will ensure these personnel are used to plan and train for wartime employment.

ABD Flights - With the ABD authorizations above those required to man the ABD sections, commanders will ensure ABD proficiency is maintained. Unit integrity should be maintained and personnel should train as flights not separate squads.

ABD Sections. Each Korean MOB will have a permanent ABD planning staff, using ABD authorizations. This staff will facilitate all ABD operations, planning, and coordinate local training of forces.

4.4.7. (Added-PACAF) M113 assets will be stored at the base where they will be used in contingency/wartime operations.

4.5. Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Operations outside the purview of war are considered MOOTW. MOOTW may include, but are not limited to, support to US, state, and local governments, disaster relief, nation assistance, drug interdiction, peacekeeping, noncombatant evacuation, and peace enforcement. MOOTW may not be peaceful actions, may be of long duration, and typically have strict rules of engagement. The complexity of MOOTW requires flexible planning and leadership.

4.6. Prisoners of War. The US Army is the lead agent in preparing for, receiving, processing, and transferring enemy prisoners of war (EPW).

4.6.1. The US Air Force is responsible for EPWs under its control until they are released to the Army. All persons captured will be treated as EPWs until their true status is determined. This includes initial processing, interim detention, medical treatment, and transfer to U.S. Army or appropriate host nation authorities. Principals of handling EPWs include firm control, humane treatment, accountability and minimum field processing. Field processing includes search, segregate, silence, speed to the rear, and safeguard.

4.6.2. Properly tag and secure the individual, associated documents, and equipment until they can be transferred to the Army. Notify the servicing AFOSI unit upon seizure of documentation to ensure timely counterintelligence evaluation and analysis. The circumstances surrounding the capture must also be documented.

Chapter 5

MOBILITY, EXERCISES, AND INSPECTIONS

5.1. SP Mobility. Commanders at all levels must clearly and realistically project their wartime manpower requirements and assign each active duty and air reserve force SP unit a wartime mission that is consistent with the guidance in the USAF WMP-1, annex T.

5.1.1. Several factors determine the number and type of deployable units maintained by CONUS commanders: 1) Defense requirements at deployment destinations, 2) Peacetime manpower authorizations at CONUS base, 3) Extent of CONUS wartime sustaining requirements, 4) Fiscal restraints, 5) Training limitations, and 6) Use of augmentation manpower resources.

5.1.2. Deployable SP units are initially limited to those reported in the USAF WMP-3, part 2. HQ USAF/SP, in concert with supported and supporting MAJCOMs direct training and equipping of replacement forces.

5.2. Exercises to Test ABD . Exercises that test the capability of US Air Force personnel to deploy to forward operating locations should also test ABD. When possible, MAJCOMs should incorporate ABD participation in US Air Force or joint service exercises. Provide exercise objectives and AARs to HQ AFSPA/SPSD not later than 30 calendar days following any exercise or real-world deployment. Information in the AAR will be integrated into the Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System to provide lessons learned and assist in the development of force planning. Prepare reports using the specific formats and content information available in AFP 102-2, Volume I, *Joint User Handbook for Message Text Formats*, and as supplemented by AFMAN 10-206, *Operational Reporting*. When AFP 102-2, Volume I, does not contain specific format for the report, use the General Administration format with the report's name as the SUBJECT.

5.3. Evaluations and Inspections. During local or higher headquarters evaluations and inspections, determine the readiness of SP units as reported in WMP-3, part 2. Review the training for personnel assigned to deployable units and the availability of required weapons, munitions, and equipment. Correct any deficiencies reported.

5.4. Forms Prescribed. AF Form 3594, Security Police Equipment and Manning Report.

RICHARD A. COLEMAN, Colonel, USAF
Chief of Security Police

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS***Abbreviations and Acronyms*

ABD—Air Base Defense

ABO—Air Base Operability

AETC—Air Education and Training Command

AFMC—Air Force Materiel Command

AFOSI—Air Force Office of Special Investigations

AFRES—Air Force Reserves

AFSPA—Air Force Security Police Agency

ANG—Air National Guard

BDOC—Base Defense Operations Center

COB—Collocated Operating Base

CONPLAN—Operation Plan in Concept Format

CONUS—Continental United States

DFC—Defense Force Commander

DOC—Designed Operational Capability

DoD—Department of Defense

EPW—Enemy Prisoner of War

GCS—Ground Combat Skills

HN—Host Nation

IN—Intelligence

JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff

JFC—Joint Force Commander

JRA—Joint Rear Area

JRAC—Joint Rear Area Coordinator

JRTC—Joint Regional Training Center

JTTP—Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

MAJCOM—Major Commands

MOB—Main Operating Base

MOOTW—Military Operations Other than War

MTC—MAJCOM Training Center

NBC—Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

NCO—Noncommissioned Officer

NGB—National Guard Bureau

OPCON—Operational Control

OPLAN—Operation Plan

POM—Program Objective Memorandum

READY—Resource Augmentation Duty Program

RF—Response Force

RAOC—Rear Area Operations Center

RTOC—Rear Tactical Operations Center

S1—HQ Administration Branch

S2—Combat Information Section

S3—Operations Branch

S4—Logistics Branch

SP—Security Police

TAOR—Tactical Area of Responsibility

TCF—Tactical Combat Force

TPFDD—Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data

UTC—Unit Type Code

WMP—War and Mobilization Plan

Attachment 2**SECURITY POLICE EQUIPMENT AND MANNING REPORT (AF FORM 3594)**

A2.1. MAJCOM/SPs get management information data from SP units within their command on 31 December and 30 June of each year. This data informs program management decisions for time-critical taskings in planned and unplanned contingencies. Use AF Form 3594 to report this information to HQ USAF/SPX.

A2.2. Reporting continues during emergency conditions using emergency status code C-2, Normal. Continue reporting during MINIMIZE.

A2.3. Forward AF Form 3594 to HQ USAF/SPX with information copies to HQ AFSPA/SPSD, to arrive not later than 15 January and 15 July each year.

A2.3.1. For sections I and III through VI of the report, indicate authorized and assigned data to support SP mobility (UTCs assigned) or in-place taskings.

A2.3.2. For mobility UTCs, use the logistics detail data to determine number of personnel authorized.

A2.3.3. For in-place units, report what equipment is authorized as determined by the parent MAJCOM.

A2.3.4. For section II, report the number of weapons authorized and assigned in the combat arms training and maintenance section.

A2.3.5. On section VII, report the number of UTCs, as reported in the WMP 3, Part 2.

**ATTACHMENT 1 (ADDED-PACAF)
SAMPLE COMBINED DEFENSE PLAN (CDP) FORMAT
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION**

REFERENCES

- a. (U-R) Air Component Command (ACC) OPLAN 5027-95, 1 Nov 95
- b. (U-R) ROK JCS SOP
- c. (U-R) ACC CONOP 301-1, 30 Nov 95, Concept of Operations, Combined Air Base Defense
- d. (U-R) Joint Publication 3-10, Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations
- e. (U-R) Joint Publication 3-10.1, 15 Mar 93, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air Base Defense AFI 31-301
- f. (U-R) USFK Reg 190-6, 3 Apr 92, Enemy Prisoners Transferred to Republic of Korea Custody
- g. (U-R) DOD 2000.12 Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence
- h. (U-R) Joint Publication 3.072

SITUATION.

- a. (X-X) General. This appendix is designed to integrate United States Air Force Security Forces (USAF/SF) with Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) Air Police, Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) units, and other air base defense units as identified in the basic OPLAN. These forces will deploy during wartime to conduct combined base defense operations for AIR BASE.
- b. (X-X) Enemy. ROKAF refer to Annex , intelligence, for basic enemy situation. USAF TPFDD forces refer to Annex B CC OPLAN 5027-95, and APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX T TO ACC OPLAN 5027-95, ENEMY SOF ANALYSIS.
- c. (X-X) Friendly. Identify dedicated friendly Air Base Defense (ABD) forces and other forces significantly contributing to ABD here. Include ROKAF APs, ROKA units, USAF Time Phased Force Deployment Detail (TPFDD) Security Forces (USAF/SF), ROKAF Air Defense Artillery (ADA) units, US Army Patriot missile units, National Police Agency (NPA) forces, etc.

**SAMPLE CDP FORMAT
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION**

SAMPLE CDP FORMAT
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

(1) (X-X) USAF SFs. (Total)

- (a) (X-X) 1 X 2 person Security Police Advance Team
- (b) (X-X) 1 X 11 person Headquarters Element
- (c) (X-X) _ X 44 person Security Police Air Base Defense Flights
- (d) (X-X) _ X 13 person Security Police squads.
- (e) (X-X) _ X 2 person 50 caliber machine gun teams
- (f) (X-X) _ X 2 person MK19 grenadier team

(Note: Add or delete number and type of UTCs as applicable.)

(2) (X-X) ROKAF Air Police

- (a) (X-X)
- (b) (X-X)

(3) (X-X) ROK Field Army (FROKA, SROKA, or TROKA)

- (a) (X-X)
- (b) (X-X)

(4) (X-X) Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Unit(s)

- (a) (X-X)
- (b) (X-X)

(5) (X-X) US Army Patriot Missile Battery(ies)

- (a) (X-X)
- (b) (X-X)

(6) (X-X) National Police Agency Units.

- (a) (X-X)
- (b) (X-X)

(7) (X-X) Other Units/Agencies as needed

- (a) (X-X)
- (b) (X-X)

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SAMPLE CDP FORMAT
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Assumptions

(1) (X-X) AIR BASE is under constant surveillance by a Level I threat (terrorist/enemy agents) and will be one of the first targets attacked at the onset of hostilities by North Korean forces. In-place ROK air base defense forces are structured to counter Level I threat.

(2) (X-X) The local area threat determines ROKAF security postures, USAF/SF alarm conditions, and readiness states for SFs/APs. Refer to Paragraph 5, Command and Signal, for specific security postures, alarm conditions and readiness states.

(3) (X-X) USAF/SFs will arrive with initial TPFDD forces and be in place prior to arrival of USAF/aircraft/resources.

(4) (X-X) This appendix identifies initial USAF/SF ABD posts which provide solid security for USAF resources, reserve forces to rapidly improve defensive fighting positions, and flexibility to adjust offensive/defensive schemes as ROKAF/ROKA positioning and modes of operation change.

e. (X-X) Resource Availability. Refer to Base Support Plan, Parts 1 and 2.

f. (X-X) Planning Factors.

(1) (X-X) Air Base Defense (ABD) Areas of Responsibility (AOR). Refer to Figure XXXXXXXX to compare USAF/ROKAF terminology. (Define AORs and designate ABD responsibilities here.)

(a) (X-X) ROKAF 1st Defense Zone.

(b) (X-X) ROKAF 2nd Defense Zone/USAF Tactical Perimeter.

(c) (X-X) ROKAF ad Defense Zone/USAF Defended Locales.

Figure XXXX, USAF/ROKAF Defense Terminology comparison

USAF	ROKAF
No Equivalent Term	1st Defense Zone
Tactical Perimeter	2nd Defense Zone
Defended Locales	3rd Defense Zone

(2) (X-X) Define identification, friend or foe procedures and fratricide reduction here.

(a) (X-X)

(b) (X-X)

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2. (X-X) MISSION. Combined air base defense forces maintain a secure environment for friendly sortie generation by integrating into rear area security operations and detecting and defeating of enemy ground based threats.

3. (X-X) EXECUTION

a. (X-X) Concept of Operations

(1) (X-X) Rear battle is a ROK Army responsibility. The Commander, First, Second, or Third ROKA (FROKA, SROKA, or TROKA) appoints a rear battle officer responsible for directing the battle effort within the applicable field army's area of responsibility. The rear battle officer will allocate forces to defend AIR BASE based on the threat, availability of assets, overall concept of operations, and the commander's priorities.

(2) (X-X) The installation commander is responsible for defense of AIR BASE and delegates that authority to. The ROKAF installation commander or designee will coordinate internal and external air base defense issues. The USAF/SF Defense Force Commander (DFC) will ensure USAF TPFDD forces are assimilated into ROKAF base defense plans.

(3) (X-X) Air base defense is accomplished as an integral part of rear area operations throughout the entire theater. The rear battle is fought within the basic tenants of the Air Land Battle with the following tenets applied to air base defense:

(a) (X-X) Initiative. ABD forces must quickly force the enemy to react to localized offensive operations. Aggressively deny landing areas, standoff weapons sites, and access to critical areas by exploiting knowledge of the local terrain and friendly populations, tactical sensors, and night/thermal vision equipment. Immediately and violently react to enemy surface to air missile (SAM) launches.

(b) (X-X) Depth. AIR BASE and its key facilities are stationary. Prepare ABD forces to resist concentrated, violent attacks by planning and employing distributed defense so the main battle is not dependent upon a single position or line of defense. Plan for defense in depth with alternative support positions and the ability to shift available support without interrupting operations.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

(c) (X-X) **Agility.** Anticipate and react to threats by moving the necessary forces to meet and destroy the threat throughout the width and depth of the area of operations (AO). The air base defense commander should consider a fairly large mobile reserve (ROKAF Mobile Strike Force) during the early stages of hostilities.

2. (X-X) **Sector 2.** Define the sector and applicable posting requirements here. Use appropriate tabs and exhibits to depict sector maps, fire support plans, critical facilities, etc.

3. (X-X) **Sectors.** Define the sector and applicable posting requirements here. Use appropriate tabs and exhibits to depict sector maps, fire support plans, critical facilities, etc.

4. (X-X) **Cantonment Security.** Define the sector and applicable posting requirements here. Use appropriate tabs and exhibits to depict sector maps, fire support plans, critical facilities, etc.

(2) (X-X) **Combined ROKAF/USAF SF Mobile Strike Force (MSF).** A combined ROKAF/USAFMSF will be established to counter Level II threats anywhere on AIR BASE.

(a) (X-X) **MSF Organization/Structure/Operation Control.**

(b) (X-X) **MSF Deployment/Employment Guidelines.**

(3) (X-X) **ROKAF Air Police will:**

(a) (X-X)

(b) (X-X)

(4) (X-X) **ROK Army.** (Identify and describe ROK field army responsibilities and AOR here.)

(a) (X-X) **ROKA units assigned to air base defense for AIR BASE are:**

(b) (X-X) **ROKA AOR is:**

(c) (X-X) **Coordinating Instructions.** Establish combined Rules of Engagement (ROE) here.

(d) (X-X) **Synchronization.** Coordinate available air base defense combat assets to simultaneously neutralize the enemy without sacrificing freedom of movement or degradation of air sortie generation.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SAMPLE CDP FORMAT
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

(5) (X-X) Highway Landing Strip Procedures. (Note: Any base supporting highway landing strips contingencies should coordinate combined defense operations in the event both USAF/ROKAF resources are diverted to the emergency landing strip areas. Include procedures to protect convoy routes, munitions, etc.)

(6) (X-X) Receiving, Analyzing, and Disseminating Intelligence. Describe any unique requirements and localized procedures for ensuring information sharing between all combined forces here. Refer to basic ROKAF and USAF OPLANs for general guidance.

(7) (X-X) Procedures for Transferring Enemy Prisoners of War. Identify local procedures specific for the air base being defended. Refer to published plans for general guidance.

(8) (X-X) Procedures for Requesting AC-130 Close Air Support.

4. (X-X) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. (X-X) Logistics. USAF refer to ANNEX D to ACC OPLAN 5027-95. The installation commander is responsible for tactical movement and operations within defined areas of responsibility (AOR)

b. (X-X) Tasks

(1) (X-X) USAF Security Force

(a) (X-X) SF Advance Team. This 2-person team deploys to AIR BASE from within theater and should arrive prior to TPFDD forces. This team is responsible for:

1. (X-X)

2. (X-X)

(b) (X-X) Headquarters Element. This 11-person element provides command and control for deployed Security Forces. Upon arrival at ...AIR BASE, the Defense Force Commander (DFC) will:

1. (X-X) Establish a Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) in a facility identified by the Base Support Plan, Parts 1 and 2, or by constructing a field expedient BDOC at a location coordinated with the ROKAF installation commander.

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2. (X-X) Provide a security force liaison to the USAF Fighter Wing (Provisional) Wing Operations Center (WOO) and the ROKAF Ground Operations Center (GOC).

3. (X-X) Coordinate, establish, and maintain a combined post listing and AOR map for all base defense operations.

4. (X-X) Establish a Rear Area Threat Assessment Group (RATAG) to develop an operational intelligence estimate describing the close term future threat to AIR BASE RATAG membership includes, but is not limited to:

- a. (X-X) The Chief, ROKAF GOC.
- b. (X-X) SF S-2, Combat Information Section (CIS).
- c. (X-X) Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI).
- d. (X-X) USAF and ROKAF Wing Intelligence representatives.
- e. (X-X) The DFC.

(c) (X-X) SF ABD Flights/Squads with Heavy Weapons and MWD Team Support. Under the direction of the GO and in coordination with the ROKAF AP commander, ABD flight and squad leaders will deploy their personnel and base defense assets in the following defense sectors.

1. (X-X) Sector 1. Define the sector end applicable posting requirements here. Use appropriate tabs and exhibits to depict sector maps, fire support plans, critical facilities, etc.

b. (X-X) Administration. Define reporting formats, time lines, and requirements here.

c. (X-X) Personnel. USAF refer to ANNEX E to ACC OPLAN 5027-95.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

5. (X-X) COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. (X-X) Command Relationships. (Define internal command relationships of the USAF TPFDD forces, external relationships between USAF and ROK units, and the operational chain of command for combined air base defense forces. General command relations are described in Annex J to ACC OPLAN 5027-95.)

- (1) (X-X)
- (2) (X-X)

b. (X-X) Security Postures and Threat Conditions. Define the ROKAF security postures and USAF Threat Conditions here. Refer to Figure X-X for a comparison of ROKAF Security Postures and USAF Threat Conditions.

- (a) (X-X) ROKAF Security Postures
 - 1. (X-X) Security Posture A/CHINDOKAE ONE:
 - 2. (X-X) Security Posture B/CHINDOKAE TWO:
 - 3. (X-X) CHINDOKAE RED:
- (b) (X-X) USAF Threat Conditions
 - 1. (X-X) THREATCON NORMAL
 - 2. (X-X) THREATCON ALPHA:
 - 3. (X-X) THREATCON BRAVO:
 - 4. (X-X) THREATCON CHARLIE:
 - 5. (X-X) THREATCON DELTA:

SECURITY POSTURE	THREAT CONDITION
No Equivalent	NORMAL
No Equivalent	ALPHA
B” or CHINDOKAE TWO	BRAVO
A” or CHINDOKAE ONE	CHARLIE
CHINDOKAE RED	DELTA

Figure XXXXX, ROKAF/USAF Security Posture and Threat Condition Comparison.

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c. (X-X) C3 Systems. Refer to Annex K to ACC OPLAN 5027-95. Describe any additional specific requirements here.

- (1) (X-X) Tactical/land mobile radio systems.
- (2) (X-X) Inter-operability requirements.
- (3) (X-X) Communications between combined Forces.

TABS:

A - USAF Sector 1

B - USAF Sector 2

C - USAF Sector 3

D - USAF Cantonment Sector

Note: Applicable tabs entered here. Enclosures and exhibits to the tabs, i.e., sector maps, fire support plans, defensive fighting positions, etc., will be annotated on specific tabs.

OFFICIAL:

ROKAF A-8 SIGNATURE BLOCK

USAF M-8 SIGNATURE BLOCK

**ROKAF HOST WING COMMANDER
SIGNATURE BLOCK**

**USAF GROUND DEFENSE FORCE
COMMANDER SIGNATURE BLOCK**

**ATTACHMENT 2 (ADDED-PACAF)
UTC WEAPONS TRAINING REQUIREMENTS**

Attachment 2 (Added-PACAF) Table 2.1. Specific Weapons Qualification Requirements

UTC	M16A2	M249	M60	M203	M9	M72/AT4	MORTAR	.50 CAL	Mk-19
QFEBA	28				5				
QFEBB	15				5				
QFEBC	55	12	9	18	6	18			
QFEBD	10						10		
QFEBF	4							4	
QFEBJ	6								6
QFEBK	8								
QFEBL	4								
QFEBP	4								
QFEBR	6				6				
QFEB2	16	4	3	6	2	6			

NOTE: The intended purpose of this table is to restrict up to the maximum training requirements to meet minimum UTC arming requirements, not to establish new minimum arming requirements.

**ATTACHMENT 3 (ADDED-PACAF)
U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL REFERENCES**

- 7-7 The Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad, MAR 85**
- 7-8 The Infantry Platoon and Squad (Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger), APR 92**
- 7-10 The Infantry Company (Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger), DEC 90**
- 7-20 The Infantry Battalion (Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger), APR 92**
- 17-95 Cavalry, SEP 91**
- 24-1 Signal Communications in the Airland Battle, OCT 90**
- 90-2 Battlefield Deception, OCT 88**
- 90-3 Desert Operations, AUG 93**
- 90-4 Air Assault Operations, MAR 87**
- 90-5 Jungle Operations, AUG 82**
- 90-6 Mountain Operations, JUN 80**
- 90-10 Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), AUG 70**
- 90-10-1 An Infantryman's Guide to Urban Combat, AUG 86**
- 100-5 Operations, JUN 93**
- 100-10 Combat Service Support, FEB 88**
- 101-5-1 Operational Terms and Graphics, OCT 85**